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The benefits, risks, and threats of biotechnology 
Brian Rappert 
This article considers how threats, risks, and benefits associated with research are defined in 
contemporary policy debates. Specifically, it examines what has become known as the ‘dual-use 
potential’ of life science research findings and techniques. Focus is given to the emerging dominant 
policy response of enacting oversight processes to weigh the risks and benefits of individual instances 
of research. The curiosity at the center of this article is how it is often said that any knowledge might 
be used for destructive ends but, in practice, it has been extremely rare that anything has even been 
identified as ‘of concern’. This situation raises basic questions about the purposes and prospects of 
oversight procedures. Various proposals are advanced in reply. These include better understanding how 
notions of the utility of research are constructed, searching for improved methods for assessing risks 
and benefits, attending to factors that might affect risk–benefit calculations, pursuing alternative 
questions and challenging fundamental tenants in policy discussions. 
CIENTISTS, POLICY-MAKERS, social re-
searchers, non-governmental organizations and 
others –– as highlighted throughout this spe-
cial issue of Science and Public Policy –– have been 
asking whether the said potential for biotechnology 
to transform health and research practice might fa-
cilitate the spread of disease through inadvertent 
mishap or deliberate intent. If so, what needs to be 
done in response? 
This article examines the relations between bio-
technology, weapons, and regulation through exam-
ining the concept of ‘biothreats’.1 Attention is given 
to what has become called the ‘dual-use potential’ of 
research findings and techniques (this in contrast 
with the dual potential for materials and equipment). 
This expression is used to designate the potential for 
findings and techniques to aid both destructive and 
non-destructive purposes. As such, the focus is on 
the end products of research rather than how it is 
conducted. 
A central curiosity under examination in this pa-
per is how, on the one hand, it is widely said that 
almost any knowledge and techniques can be used 
for destructive purposes and how, on the other hand, 
in practice it has been extremely rare that anything 
has been identified as ‘of concern’. 
With regard to the former point, for instance, in 
the highly influential US National Research Council 
(NRC) report Biotechnology Research in an Age of 
Terrorism, Professor Gerald Fink (2003: vii) ex-
pressed concerns about the ever-present dual poten-
tial of research when he argued that “almost all 
biotechnology in the service of human health can be 
subverted for misuse by hostile individuals or  
nations”. This report and the follow-up 2006 NRC 
report Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of 
the Life Sciences outlined numerous ways in which 
rapid developments in biotechnology and the spread 
of capabilities and expertise were creating ever-more 
realistic possibilities for modifying traditional 
bioweapon agents and producing new ones. 
With regard to identifying specific elements that 
might raise security concerns, many responsive pol-
icy measures have consisted of employing existing 
scientific oversight mechanisms (such as peer re-
view and institutional boards) to identify activities 
for scrutiny, to weigh the prospective risks and 
benefits of individual proposals or publications, and 
then to make judgments about what should be 
done. 
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For instance, in early 2003, a group of 32 science 
journals agreed general progress guidelines for re-
viewing, modifying, and perhaps rejecting manu-
scripts where “the potential harm of publication 
outweighs the potential societal benefits” (Journal 
Editors and Authors Group, 2003: 1464). A number 
of other statements have called for or codified the 
adoption a risk–benefit approach including the 
World Health Organization’s Life Science Research: 
Opportunities and Risks for Public Health,2 the UK 
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research 
Council, Medical Research Council and Wellcome 
Trust’s Managing Risks of Misuse Associated with 
Grant Funding Activities,3 the American Medical 
Association’s Guidelines to Prevent Malevolent Use 
of Biomedical Research,4 and the US National Sci-
ence Advisory Board on Biosecurity’s (NSABB) 
Draft Criteria for Dual Use Research of Concern.5 
The last is particularly significant given that the 
board was set up following the recommendations of 
the Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism 
report to offer advice to the federal government re-
garding the oversight of research. 
It is worthwhile to note that the measures put in 
place to date have not identified many individual 
elements of research as ‘of concern’, let alone led to 
judgments that they should not be undertaken or 
somehow limited in circulation. As noted in the 
March 2006 meeting of NSABB, of a sample of 
16,000 manuscripts submitted to the journals of the 
American Society for Microbiology, only three were 
subjected to additional biosecurity peer review and 
of those only one was required to be modified prior 
to publication. Moreover, in a 15-month period be-
tween mid-2005 and late 2006, 15 papers submitted 
to the journals of the Nature Publishing Group were 
identified as ‘of concern’. None were stopped or re-
quired to make alterations (Miller, 2006). 
Despite having taken dual-use considerations into 
account in the past in making grant decisions, prior 
to its 2005 statement on Managing Risks of Misuse 
Associated with Grant Funding Activities, the Well-
come Trust had never refused an application or 
sought to impose publication restrictions because of 
such concerns. From the time of its 2005 statement 
setting out a formal policy to late 2006, the trust 
identified three proposals as needing additional dual-
use scrutiny. Of those, two were not funded for non-
biosecurity-related reasons, and the remaining one 
was funded after consultation with advisors (Terry, 
2006). As part of the Sixth Framework Programme, 
the European Union (EU) set up an advisory body to 
review bids selected for funding for their ‘dual-use’ 
potential, which was broadly conceived as research 
having civilian and military utility. In 2006, 411 
proposals were selected for EU funding and of those 
six (1.46%) were identified as raising dual-use con-
cerns, at least two of which were not related to the 
life sciences (European Commission, 2007). 
As well, a US National Research Council (NRC) 
committee established to examine the advantages 
and disadvantages of restricting access to genome 
databases not only advocated continuing with past 
‘open’ access practices (largely disregarding com-
mercialization and IPR considerations), but in the 
2004 report Seeking Security: Pathogens, Open  
Access and Genome Databases it expressed major 
misgivings about the possibility of identifying cate-
gories of genome data that were ‘of concern’. In the 
cases of the publication in Nature of the sequences 
for remaining unsequenced parts of the 1918 Span-
ish flu virus (Taubenberger et al, 2005) and its arti-
ficial reconstruction published in Science (Tumpey 
et al, 2005), both journals and NSABB agreed the 
benefits of going ahead with such publications out-
weighed any possible risks (Rappert, 2007a). 
Instead of there being a significant list of in-
stances of problematic ‘dual-use research’, much of 
the policy focus has been with a handful of examples. 
This includes the undertaking and publication of the 
interleukin-4 gene (IL-4) mousepox experiment 
(Jackson et al, 2001) as well as the successful artifi-
cial chemical synthesis of poliovirus (Cello et al, 
2002). For these prominent experiments, arguments 
that they should not have been undertaken or pub-
lished because of biosecurity concerns have been 
exceedingly rare. 
In contrast to this general pattern, it is noteworthy 
that the pre-project internal dual-use review con-
ducted as part of the National Institutes of Health-
funded Southeast Regional Center of Excellence for 
Emerging Infections and Biodefense (SERCEB)  
determined 10 out of the 27 proposals were ‘of con-
cern’. This high ‘hit rate’ was attributed to the  
emphasis within SECREB on pathogens and host  
defenses (Davidson et al, 2007). 
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Responses to curiosity 
What might be made of the paradoxical manner in 
which it is said that nearly any knowledge might be 
used for destructive ends but it has been extremely 
rare that any has been identified as ‘of concern’? 
Response #1: Understand claims making process 
One starting point would be noting that assessments 
of the benign or malign utility of research are not de-
termined simply by reading experimental results. 
Rather, much depends on how interpretations are 
made about the meaning of that work. Just where 
‘red lines’, exclamation points, or question marks 
should be drawn because of concerns over dual-use 
needs to be seen as dependent on factors such as: 
evaluation criteria, notions of what counts as perti-
nent information, and proposed identified relevant 
contexts for consideration. Examining how criteria, 
data, and contexts are marshaled (and by whom) is 
one possible means for understanding the justifica-
tion for contrasting assessments of the relevance(s) 
of the life sciences. 
The importance of attending to the variability of 
scientists’ accounts about the meaning of research 
was suggested in a classic study by Gilbert and  
Mulkay (1984). Based on extended interviews with 
biologists in the field of bioenergetics, they argued 
that such researchers often portrayed their work in 
multiple and divergent ways depending on the situa-
tion in question. The authors illustrated this variabil-
ity by detailing different ‘interpretative repertoires’. 
In writing articles, for instance, those studied over-
whelmingly employed an ‘empiricist repertoire’. 
This entailed providing highly impersonal accounts 
devoid of any concerns about personal preconcep-
tions or commitments. In contrast, in more informal 
settings (such as interviews) this was mixed with a 
contingent repertoire wherein: 
scientists presented their actions and beliefs as 
heavily dependent on speculative insights, prior 
intellectual commitments, personal characteris-
tics, indescribable skills, social ties and group 
membership. (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984: 56) 
Rather than establishing which repertoire was correct, 
Gilbert and Mulkay took the variable, context-
dependent status of accounts to indicate that attention 
should be given to how different ways of accounting 
for science are rhetorically organized to provide 
warrant for particular claims. 
Building on this orientation of science claims as 
interpretative accomplishments, one way forward 
would be to compare the manner in which warrant is 
given to claims about the varying contribution of re-
search to destructive and non-destructive ends. For 
instance, Van Aken (2006) argued that the recon-
struction of the 1918 Spanish flu virus was quite 
risky vis-à-vis its malign use because “no virus 
combining high contagiousness with a compara-
tively high mortality rate has been readily available 
so far”. Yet, he also argued that: 
the added value of one extra strain [for peaceful 
applications], even one with an exceptionally 
high mortality rate, is limited, given that strains 
with varying degrees of contagiousness and 
pathogenicity are available and provide a 
wealth of research resources for comparative 
studies. 
Just how the study of the same virus can be seen as 
both exceptional (for destructive ends) and ordinary 
(for peaceful ends) is a matter worthy of further 
elaboration. 
Take as well debates about the merits of publish-
ing the IL-4 mousepox experiment in the Journal 
of Virology (Shenk, 2003; see Rappert, 2007a). A 
former editor of the Journal of Virology contended 
that restricting IL-4 research relevant to bioweapon 
applications would “seriously risk disrupting” sci-
ence since any attempt to do so would implicate 
large sways of activities. As he elaborated, the re-
sults obtained by the Australians could be “guessed 
at” from what was said to be “out there in the lit-
erature” (Shenk, 2003). Yet, particularly because of 
the prestige of the Journal of Virology, such an  
attribution of obviousness begs the question of why 
the article was published at all. Presumably, in rela-
tion to the positive scientific merit of the article, 
the editors determined that it made a contribution 
to the field. 
Investigating the basis for such contrasting inter-
pretations might well bring to the fore many implicit 
assumptions and ways of reasoning. Through under-
standing these contingent ways of reasoning, it 
might be possible to go further to comment on pro-
posals for future action. For instance, in light of the 
general dispute about the security implications of  
research and the said limited novelty of the IL-4 
mousepox research, the former editor of the Journal 
of Virology proposed that security attention be  
directed towards unexpected findings. Yet this is not 
likely to be a straightforward recommendation be-
cause of the multiple ways research is made mean-
ingful. In general, and in contrast to many popular 
portrayals of science, the meaning of ‘unexpected’, 
‘new’, ‘unique’, ‘exceptional’ or any other such 
characteristic of research is open for disagreement 
(Brannigan, 1981). 
Response #2: Find better ways of calculating risks 
Another response would be to shore up the risk–
benefit assessment methods central to procedures for 
evaluating research. Calls to weigh the risk and 
benefits of publications or experiments to date have 
largely been just that, general statements with little 
in the way of elaboration regarding what counts as 
risks, benefits, or how they should be weighed. 
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Various statements have been made about the 
need for refinements of risk assessments. The report 
of a 2006 Royal Society–InterAcademy Panel–
International Council for Science workshop titled 
Science and Technology Developments Relevant to 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, for 
instance, called for improved risk assessment and 
management techniques (Royal Society, 2007). In 
relation to biothreats, Van Aken (2006) bemoaned 
the lack of a “systematic approach to a general risk-
benefit analysis” and called for “internationally 
harmonized and legally binding rules” regarding the 
oversight of research. Holohan (2007) too has called 
for the use of more objective and reliable methods of 
risk assessment. 
As part of its Prototype Protective Oversight Sys-
tem, individuals at the Center for International and 
Security Studies at the University of Maryland have 
suggested criteria to be incorporated into risk-benefit 
analysis (Harris, 2007). The criteria they offer for 
assessment fall under a number of categories, in-
cluding biosafety issues, evaluation of research plan, 
public health considerations, biodefense considera-
tions, current necessity, and potential impact. 
By elaborating criteria, the Prototype Protective 
Oversight System goes beyond many of the current 
risk–benefit calls. Yet, many of its suggested criteria 
are likely to be the topic of considerable interpreta-
tion along the lines discussed in the previous section. 
For instance, answers to questions such as: 
• Will the countermeasures that are expected to re-
sult from the work significantly reduce the threat 
posed to the agent? 
• Will the proposed research contribute to new 
knowledge rather than primarily confirm work al-
ready done? and 
• Will the proposed research advance our under-
standing of disease causing properties of currently 
existing agents?’ 
are likely to turn on the (varying) interpretation 
given to terms such as ‘expected’, ‘new’, and ‘ad-
vancing’. As suggested previously, these are not 
matters that can simply be read from research  
reports. Key issues are who makes these determina-
tions and how. 
In this regard, another option is to think about the 
starting orientation to risks and benefits. In relation 
to scientific uncertainties and unknowns about the 
environmental costs and risks associated with topics 
as diverse as chemical hazards, fishing techniques, 
and the spread of viral diseases, the importance of a 
precautionary orientation has become commonplace 
in recent years. To be sure, just what a precautionary 
approach entails is varyingly defined. However, 
practices such as attending to ignorance, acknowl-
edging blind spots, seeking alternative options, and 
incorporating ‘lay’ knowledge into decision-making 
have all been associated with it (Harremonds et al, 
2002). 
Response #3: Attend to conditions of assessment 
While international efforts to date might have identi-
fied few instances of research that are security-
relevant (let alone problematic), it is an open question 
whether that might change in the future. This is es-
pecially so given the current focus on the education 
of scientists and others in matters of biosecurity. In 
conference reports and statements, organizations 
such as the British Medical Association, the World 
Medical Association, the US National Research 
Council, the British Royal Society, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, the InterAcademy 
Panel, the US NSABB, the International Council for 
Science as well as the states parties to the Biological 
and Toxin Weapons Convention have argued for 
greater education of those in the life sciences (see 
Rappert, 2007b). Again though, similar to calls to 
weigh risks and benefits associated with individual 
experiments or publications, these calls have been 
fairly abstract in character. 
A key question for any educational activity is 
whether it seeks to challenge existing ways of think-
ing about science. As has been argued in the past 
with regard to vivisection, researchers can be some-
what lacking in their willingness and unaided ability 
to assess the downsides of their own work (Rollin, 
2006). 
To elaborate, many of the existing and proposed 
assessment procedures rely on principal investiga-
tors, peer reviewers and others to make judgments 
on the basis of their scientific expertise –– this with 
little in way of explicit structured guidance or sup-
port information. When the director of the UK-based 
Wellcome Trust was asked in 2004 what criteria re-
viewers of grant applications have used to judge 
‘dual use’ in the past, he refused to give a: 
formulaic answer because I think these are all 
matters of judgment … I think it is difficult to 
define any precise formulaic answer to that. I 
think they use their wisdom.6 
Subsequent policy developments in the Wellcome 
Trust (as well as the BBRSC and Medical Research 
Council) embody the general spirit of relying on 
largely unaided scientific expertise to determine 
risks. Grant referees, for instance, as part of a list of 
issues for further consideration are asked are asked 
to consider “tangible risks that the research could be 
used for terrorist or other harmful purposes”. The 
Wellcome Trust’s 2005 Guidelines on Good Re-
search Practice state that in relation to the risk of 
the misuse of research: 
• In progressing their scientific investigations, re-
searchers should actively consider any risks that 
their research will generate outcomes that could 
be misused for harmful purposes. Where such 
risks exist, they should seek advice and take ac-
tive steps to minimise them. 
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• Institutions should have in place mechanisms to 
ensure that risks of misuse associated with ongo-
ing research programmes are identified and  
managed, and to provide advice to the researchers 
that they employ on these issues.7 
While the second point indicates the need for advice 
to be given to researchers, just how this is to be done 
is unspecified. There are no national university edu-
cational programs being devised for public sector or 
other researchers in the UK that would underpin 
such mechanisms. In general the activities of the 
Wellcome Trust in relation to dual-use concerns 
amount to offering fairly open-ended and non-
prescriptive details regarding how individuals and 
institutions ought to go about evaluating dual-use 
concerns. That is a matter for the “experts”. 
This stands in contrast with plans in the USA 
where NSABB has been tasked with advising on cri-
teria for dual-use research, institutional governance 
systems for appraising research, and the make-up of 
mandatory biosecurity training programs for feder-
ally funded researchers. 
The choices made with regard to the specific of 
procedures may be highly consequential in how 
many experiments or publications are signaled for 
review and the outcomes of any such procedures. 
For instance, questions can be asked about what 
guidance will be given to principal investigators in 
assessing risks and benefits, who else within a host 
institution will be required to take part in assess-
ments, what role (if any) will be given for those with 
security expertise, how practicing researchers will be 
educated about biosecurity matters, and what 
mechanisms will be in place to monitor the oversight 
of research. Just whether, when and why assess-
ments of research might alter from the past pattern 
of dual-use appraisals would be a useful topic for fu-
ture empirical research.8 
Response #4: Ask other questions 
Instead of merely asking how to modify the proce-
dures of predictive risk-benefit assessments of indi-
vidual elements of research, the rarity of the 
identification of research as ‘of concern’ might lead 
to a fundamental rethink in the way the matter of 
dual-use research is conceptualized. Taking as given 
for the moment the conclusion that it is extremely 
difficult to identify security-relevant developments, 
another response would be to move away from the 
framing of individual instances of research. Instead 
the cumulative developments in the life sciences 
would be the prime concern. So rather than asking 
whether particular findings taken in isolation cross 
some threshold, attention could be given to devel-
opments in major paths of research as a whole and, 
in particular, what these mean for the proliferation of 
enabling capabilities. As such, a more pertinent 
question than ‘Is this finding dangerous?’ is ‘What is 
being made routine?’ An exception to the otherwise 
absence of such overview thinking has been in the 
debate initiated in synthetic biology about the field’s 
direction and implications.9 
Similarly, rather than focusing on questions such 
as ‘Should this particular experiment go ahead?’ at-
tention could be given to questions such as ‘What di-
rection of research should be funded?’ (see Johnson, 
1999). On the negative side, the matter of funding is 
particularly relevant for the USA given the massive 
increase in biodefense funding since 9/11 and the  
establishment of research institutes such as the  
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures 
Center’s Biological Threat Characterization Center. 
Much contention has surrounded whether the latter, 
in particular, will violate current international 
agreement regarding what constitutes permissible 
defensive activities under the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention. On the affirmative side, con-
sideration might also be given to directions of re-
search that address the infectious diseases that 
undermine health and security worldwide, as sug-
gested in the DNA for Peace initiative.10 
Response #5: Question-starting premises 
As part of stepping back from the current framing 
of threats, risks and benefits, it is not only possible 
to ask other questions but also challenge the pre-
sumptions that underlie many current discussions. 
For instance, much of the existing policy debate 
about security in the life sciences warns against the 
imposition of controls because they would damage 
the said ‘norm’ of openness in scientific research 
that is central to the exchange of ideas and the rep-
lication of research findings (see Rappert, 2007a: 
Chapter 2). Yet, this sort of reaction against secu-
rity restrictions stands in somewhat of a contrast to 
the desire to obtain commercial/intellectual prop-
erty rights –– a practice that, though contentious in 
many respects, has become further and further inte-
grated into public sector biomedical research in  
recent decades. 
Another way of reframing discussions would be 
to query the significant medical benefits so often at-
tributed to life science research. In calling for more 
systematic methods for assessing risks and benefits, 
Van Aken (2006) argued for placing more attention 
on how benefits are calculated. Authors such as 
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Sarewitz (1996) have gone even further to question 
the inevitability of the relationship between the 
amount of biomedical research undertaken and 
health improvements. Securing the latter, as he 
maintained, should be de-autolinked from expendi-
ture on the former: the search for new technologies 
to address health problems often adds considerable 
costs, “obscures socioeconomic reasons for health 
problems [and] creates boundary to other types of 
action that are more effective, efficient, and equita-
ble” (1996: 150). In other words, research is far too 
often seen as the best (if not the only viable) means 
of improving health (see as well Baker and Kaprio, 
2005). The sort of rethinking suggested in this para-
graph places the benefits of research in rather a less 
flattering light than it is often given in biosecurity 
discussions. In addition though, querying the likeli-
hood that research translates into positive health 
benefits might well also have implications for how 
likely it is deemed that research can translate into 
destructive applications. 
Response #6: Take as a sign that procedures are 
having an effect 
The curiosity at the center of this article need not be 
treated as an oddity. As suggested to the author by 
certain participants to the Biosecurity and Genomics 
Workshop from which this special issue originated, 
it could be taken as indicating that the procedures 
put in place are effective and in broad terms work-
ing. So, it could be argued that researchers have de-
liberately avoided submitting publications, grant 
applications, or experiment requests because of the 
procedures in place. As such, the low numbers of in-
stances of research identified as needing scrutiny is a 
result of the impact of the procedures rather than the 
failure of them to have an impact. Depending on 
how one conceives of the dual-use research issue, 
such changes in practice may be taken as either a 
move to more responsible research or a sign of a 
damaging chill. 
Closing remarks 
This article has examined how threats, risks, and 
benefits associated with ‘dual-use’ life science re-
search findings and techniques are defined in con-
temporary policy debates. This has been done by 
considering the emerging dominant response of es-
tablishing processes to weight the prospective risks 
and benefits of individual instances of research. 
The discrepancy between claims that nearly any 
knowledge might be used for destructive ends and 
experience to date with attempts to identify what is 
‘of concern’ has been used as a springboard for 
questioning how threats, risks, and benefits are de-
fined. There are significant grounds for apprehen-
sion regarding the introduction of risk–benefit 
assessment procedures that find little of concern. 
Such assessments might either miss important de-
velopments or impose needless forms of oversight. 
The distinct danger for the future is that ‘weighing 
the risks and benefits’ becomes a pervasive mantra 
whose repetition provides (some degree of) legiti-
mization for procedures and organizations, but little 
else besides. 
This article has elaborated a range of possible re-
sponses to the overall state of affairs so as to move 
on from current policy deliberations. Each has a de-
gree of plausibility and each likely has advantages if 
pursued through further investigation. While various 
problems and prospects have been noted with each, 
in closing I want to provide some overt personal re-
marks that have implications for future policy and 
research into policy. 
In relation to Response #6, if it is the case that 
many researchers have deliberately avoided certain 
actions, then this needs to be substantiated. How-
ever, given experience with risk–benefit review 
processes –– little is identified as ‘of concern’ and 
much less affected –– it seems doubtful this is the 
case. If researchers are restricting their actions, they 
are likely to be working with a mistaken view of 
likely consequences of reviews. 
Currently within biosecurity discussions, much 
emphasis has been given to the second response of 
finding more systematic means of calculating risks. 
While there seems little doubt that current risk–
benefit approaches could be improved, there are 
likely to be persistent difficulties in calculating risks 
of the future destructive use of research in uncertain 
ways by unidentified individuals. In any case, in de-
vising any such methods, it should be borne in mind 
that the determination of ‘risks’ and ‘benefits’ is not 
a narrow technical exercise reserved for certain ex-
perts. Instead it requires the engagement of a wider 
range of social groups. 
Because of the preliminary quality of many dis-
cussions about dual-use results and techniques as 
well as the often fundamentally contrasting ways of 
making sense of the issues at stake, Response #1 
would seem to offer a fruitful approach for investi-
gation. Such investigations might inform dual-use 
educational and outreach activities. These activities 
are of vital importance, at least in part because of the 
lack of prior knowledge by practitioners or overall 
professional reflection on matters specifically related 
to dual-use results in the life sciences (Davidson et 
al, 2007; McLeish and Nightingale, 2005; Rappert et 
al, 2006). 
Given the current attention (if not practical ac-
tion) to education worldwide, perhaps the response 
in the most need of additional effort is Response 
#4. The importance in attending to matters such as 
what research should be funded and the capacities 
enabled by cumulative developments is matched by 
the difficulty of devising forms of intervention. 
These are vital matters in biosecurity that raise 
weighty questions for those in the life sciences and 
beyond. 
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Notes 
1. Following standard conventions in intelligence studies, ‘threat’ 
is taken to be a function of capability and intent; factors often 
mutually determined (see Boudeau, 2007). 
2. Available at <http://www.who.int/ethics/Life%20Science% 
20Research.pdf>, last accessed 20 October 2007. 
3. Available at <http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/doc_wtx026594. 
html>, last accessed 20 October 2007. 
4. Available at <http://www.biosecuritycodes.org/docs/AMA% 
20Code.pdf>, last accessed 20 October 2007. 
5. For a description see <http://www.biosecurityboard.gov/ 
meetings/200603/Draft%20Criteria%20for%20Identifying% 
20Dual%20Use%20Research-30mar.pdf>, last accessed 20 
October 2007. 
6. Plenary statement made at the conference titled “Do No 
Harm”, London, the Royal Society 7 October 2004. 
7. From <http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/doc_WTD002753.html>, 
last accessed 20 October 2007. 
8. In this regard, as in the case of SERCEB rolling out educa-
tional training, the effect brought about by such endeavors for 
practicing scientists’ and students’ identification and evalua-
tion of dual-use research as ‘of concern’ would be instructive 
to gauge. Indeed, the relative familiarity of the reviewers that 
were part of the SERCEB process might also be a factor in 
the relatively high rate at which it identified proposals as ‘of 
concern’. 
9. Including meetings such as the Venter Institute, CSIS and 
MIT meeting Synthetic Genomics: Risks and Benefits for Sci-
ence and Society, 4 December 2006, Washington, DC. 
10. DNA for Peace: Reconciling Biodevelopment and Biosecurity. 
Available at <http://www.utoronto.ca/jcb/home/documents/ 
DNA_Peace.pdf>, last accessed 20 October 2007. 
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